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This paper studies wage changes in a 37-year panel of occupations and employers drawn 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey (CSS).  Using an 
institutional model of the wage-setting process as a guide, we 1) identifjl wage adjustments in 
two embedded relative prices and 2) draw inferences about the costs and benefits of inflation 
from the adjustments in these relative prices. 
Typical institutional wage-setting policies manage employer-wide wage adjustments 
(controlling for occupational wage changes) and interoccupational wage changes (controlling for 
employer wage changes) separately. In the CSS, we are able to identifjl large independent 
employer and occupation components of wage changes.  While there is no a priori reason for 
these adjustments to be altered by inflation (when the average change is subtracted out), 
variation in both of these terms is positively correlated with inflation. 
In the interpretation phase of the paper, we treat employer-wide wage deviations as 
emphasizing forecasting errors and differences in the speed of adjustment to inflation. In 
contrast, we argue that occupational wage deviations include a higher concentration of market- 
driven relative price adjustments. This simple dichotomy, whose robustness we attempt to test, 
yields two policy-oriented results: 1) Higher inflation and labor productivity appear to increase 
the rate of occupational wage adjustments ("grease"),  although these potential benefits taper off 
after inflation rises to about 4 percent (assuming 1.5 percent average growth of labor 
productivity); and 2) Potentially inefficient variations in employer wage adjustments ("sand") 
continue to mount until inflation reaches rates of 7 to 10 percent (again assuming productivity 
growth of 1.5 percent). 
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How does inflation affect the labor market? This paper explores the effects of the level of 
inflation on the dispersion of wage changes in order to expand our knowledge of the impact and 
transmission of inflation in the labor market.  Our findings add to the literatures on both wage 
flexibility (or rigidity) and inflation's impact on price adjustments. 
This paper's strength--the unusually tight link we forge between our analytic approach 
and common compensation adjustment practices--is made possible by the data set we study. The 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey (CSS) from 1956 to  1992 offers 
detailed data on employers' actual wage adjustments. Because the purpose of the data set is to 
provide participating employers with information on market wage adjustments, it records wages 
at the level of detail that compensation managers desire for assessing their market position. 
Thus, the relative wages we consider are the margins of adjustment within which the firms 
maintain comparability of their wage structure with competitors in their labor market.  We find 
that variability in both occupation- and employer-relative wages increases with inflation. 
We draw inferences about the costs and benefits of inflation by examining the association 
between inflation measures and the dispersion of occupation-wide and employer-wide wage 
changes. Variation in these terms can be seen as desirable (increased occupational wage 
flexibility) or undesirable (increased variation between employers). In keeping with the 
exploratory nature of the exercise, we use statistical procedures to confirm the robustness of the 
relationship between these terms and inflation, rather than imposing structural restrictions on the 
associations we detect. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section applies institutional wage-setting 
procedures to decompose notional wage adjustments into the terms we analyze.  Section three 
reviews the two strands of relevant literature and contrasts our approach with those previously 
taken.  In the fourth and fifth sections, we describe our data and confirm that the nature of wage 
adjustments observed is consistent with the model we advance. The sixth section analyzes 
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several checks on the robustness of our findings.  The final section summarizes our findings. 
2. Institutional Wage Adjustment 
Could an inflation-induced hike in the dispersion of wage changes be beneficial, or could 
it reflect distortions in the labor market?  The answer to this question depends on the unobserved 
motivations of firms.  We develop our statistical analysis in the context of the institutional wage- 
setting practices that the data were designed to inform. We base our institutional model on 
discussions with personnel executives, compensation textbook descriptions of the process, and 
compensation managers' responses in Levine's (1 993) and others' surveys. 
a.  Typical Compensation Policies 
Fundamentally, observed salaries are bounded on the high end by workers' marginal 
products and on the low end by employees' outside opportunities. However, these constraints 
may not determine a unique wage in most corporate settings because both parties have limited 
current information on individuals' productivity and labor market options. Since employers do 
not observe labor supply and demand functions, they develop compensation policies to attract 
and retain qualified employees. Although these policies differ across firms, large employers' 
practices typically share the following common features:  a job evaluation program to rate jobs; 
salary grades or a wage line to assign earnings to  jobs according to their evaluations; and a merit- 
or seniority-based system to govern wage growth within salary grades.' 
Annual compensation budgets, and therefore average pay increases, are determined by 
top management, typically the chief executive officer (Freedman [1976]).  After approval (two to 
six months in advance of the actual salary adjustments), the budget provides the total "pie" for 
wage increases to be split up among departments, and then within departments in accordance 
with perceived merit and labor market conditions for particular workers or groups of workers. 
Examples of compensation policy references that describe and recommend these practices include Hills 
(1987), MiIkovich and Newman (1990), and Wallace and Fay (1988). 
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takes the form described above.2 
In a 1976 Conference Board survey on corporate compensation setting, compensation 
executives indicated that a diverse set of factors is important in determining the compensation 
budget.  Table 1 summarizes the prevalence of these factors for industries relevant to those 
covered in the Cleveland Community Salary Survey (CSS), the source of the data analyzed in 
this study.  While the factors considered vary somewhat among worker categories and industries, 
several conclusions can be drawn fiom the table.  First, area wage surveys constitute the single 
most influential factor in compensation budgeting for workers such as those typically covered in 
the CSS.3  Second, this list of indicators clearly picks up labor supply and demand conditions as 
well as the inflationary environment.  Third, to an economist's eye, the list also emphasizes the 
limited information available to firms as they set wages.  In an uncertain environment, 
interemployer variation either in the factors chosen for determining wages or in their reading of 
these factors could contribute substantially to variation in wage growth rates. 
8.  Statistical Implementation 
If firms foresaw all necessary adjustments and relied completely on wage scales specified 
by job characteristics (or on a point system based on job characteristics)--adjusted to market 
wage rates--then any individual's wage change could be decomposed as follows: 
(1)  A(ln Wit) = whit = at +  Fft + OOt  +  E,  in each labor market, 
For unionized employees, negotiations on more detailed terms and conditions of pay increases (or 
reductions) take place further in advance because contracts typically last about three years. Nevertheless, the firm 
completes a prospective compensation budget, similar to nonunion budgeting, prior to negotiations in order to 
establish the acceptable range of wage adjustments. The data analyzed here include very few unionized 
employees, because of the occupations surveyed.  However, because many of the establishments included are 
partially unionized, spillover effects are possible. 
Area wage surveys are the most commonly mentioned factor for nonexempt salaried workers.  In cases 
where other factors were cited more--union hourly employees (union demands) or executives and officers 
(companies' financial reports)--area surveys are still frequently cited factors in establishing compensation 
budgets. See also Levine (1993), which reports that in a survey of 139 compensation executives, wage change 
recommendations rarely reflect unemployment rates, quit rates, and corporate returns on assets. 
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While an unconstrained tit could obviously  spec^ all wage changes, meaningful underlying 
concepts are identified by location, firm, and occupation components. General wage increases 
are picked up by at (change of the local log wage baseline).  If wage inflation rates do not vary 
by locality, then this term equals the national rate of wage inflation.  Fft represents the change in 
firm  f  s "market position" at period t;  a positive Ff, marks a decision to increase employers7 
overall pay relative to the general market.  In the compensation literature, firms are generally 
viewed as maintaining their average wages at a fixed deviation from other local employers' offers 
for a variety of reasons, i.e., Ff, is typically 0.4 Next, Oot is the change in the occupational 
differential for workers in occupation o.  Competition among firms for employees with specific 
occupational skills tends to equalize both the levels and the changes in these differentials across 
firms.  Individual-specific adjustments (tit) include merit and longevity raises. 
Lacking full information on the year's realizations of a, and O0,  firms look primarily to 
each other and to public measures of inflation for guidance, so they may make errors. If we 
modifjr equation (1) to allow for mistakes, wage changes become more complicated: 
(2)  wfoit  = at +a> +  Ffi  + Oot +  O;ot  + &it, 
where a> and O;ot  represent realized employer errors in determining the current local and 
occupational wage adjustments.  The timing of the payroll year may also result in firms leading or 
lagging their desired market position at a particular date, an outcome that we consider simply 
another form of error in the firm's attempt to match the local inflation rate.  Note that all 
equilibrium wage adjustments can still be described by varying ci,. 
Ideally, we would use individual wage adjustments gathered from a large array of 
employers to identifjr the components in equation (2); however, in most years, the CSS records 
wages not of individuals, but as means or medians for "job cells" which specifjr the location, 
Groshen (1991~)  discusses the various explanations for observed wage variation among employers. 
These include systematic human capital differences, compensating differentials, errors, efficiency wages, and 
rent-sharing.  AU of these reasons, except errors, are long-term strategies. 
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poses no inherent problem because it simply aggregates the individual-specific error by cell. 
Thus, the structure of the CSS allows decomposition of wage changes into four terms at most: 
employers, occupations, cities, and residuals.  Specifically, we estimate these components via the 
following fixed-effects regression: 
(3)  wfo = a  + P D  + y Do  + CLJ.,, for each locality and year, 
where f3  and y are coefficient vectors for matrices of dummy variables (Dl  and Do) referring to 
the cell's firm  and occupation, respectively. 
The possibility of firm-specific errors for occupations that we highlight in equation (2) 
(i.e., O;ot)  means that we cannot confidently assume that the coefficient vector P provides 
unbiased estimates of the FP's  in equation (1).  Furthermore, the lack of restrictions on the 
individual-specific term (sit) will confound the direct correspondence between equations (1) and 
(3) if correlations of the cell mean (or median) with firms or occupations exist. While we have 
reason to believe that these biases are small, we need to clarifjr the nature of the potential mis- 
identifications by the fixed-effects estimation in equation (3) in order to guide robustness checks 
of our findings. 
The primary concerns in our application are O;ot  and tit Applying a hypothetical 
regression of occupation and employer dummy variables on the unobserved term (Oyot  ) would 
allow identification of linear employer and occupation components along with a residual.  These 
hypothetical terms (which will be identified by hats,  and 670co)  allocate the misidentified 
variation.  Similarly, the individual differences term (sit) can be decomposed into the employer 
and occupational terms. After we allocate and bracket these terms according to which 
coefficient they would affect, equation (2) becomes the following: 
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(or timing differences). We conjecture that the two other terms are small, and we attempt to 
ferret out the robustness of our conclusions to this assumption. As we stated earlier, the 
compensation literature argues that Ff, is small because employers make long-run decisions on 
the quality of employee desired.  The fourth term, sf,, ,  represents the bias due to the firm's 
workforce composition. To the extent that employers report wages for many workers and that 
changes in worker skill levels offset each other (i.e., have a sampling mean of zero), this term will 
vanish. 
The estimated occupational coefficients (the y7s)  represent an agglomeration of market 
responses (0,)  and biases common to a particular occupation across firms  and B,,). 
We expect both of the bias terms to be small when there are many independent employers for an 
occupation and when the labor force within an occupation has changed minimally over the year. 
Furthermore, the occupation-specific component of wage adjustments is, arguably, primarily an 
intentional market outcome. We believe (but not strongly enough to forgo robustness checks) 
that the intentional responses should predominate. 
A priori, there is no reason to expect any particular relationship between variability in 
these relative wage terms and inflation -- the scaling effect of inflation and real wage growth has 
been removed by the intercept in the log wage specification. 
3. Inflation and Wage Adjustment 
Extensive literatures describe reasons why relative prices can be altered by purely 
nominal shocks. However, no research has been applied to the relative wages we consider here. 
We first review these literatures, then outline our strategy for interpreting hypotheses in this 
context. 
a.  Wage Rigidity Studies--Inflation as Grease 
Keynesian macroeconomics depends heavily on the assumption of downward nominal 
price andlor wage rigidity; that is, recessions occur when such stickiness prevents markets fiom 
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notions of fairness make real wage erosion, imposed by idation, more acceptable than nominal 
cuts.  Thus, general wage and price inflation can be a mechanism to reduce cyclical 
unemployment and raise economic efficiency.5 An important corollary of this reasoning, 
developed by Slichter (see Slichter and Luedicke [1957]) and Tobin (1972), argues that even 
without large shocks, moderate rates of inflation can "grease the wheels" of the economy, 
facilitating downward real price changes in response to small shocks. While the neo-Keynesian 
perspective appears to favor sticky goods prices over sticky wages as the explanation for 
monetary non-neutrality, this is partly due to empirical concerns about the rigidity of wages (see 
Ball and Mankiw [  19941). 
Within the wide variety of studies that look for empirical evidence of wage rigidity, the 
largest group examines aggregate real wages for evidence of procyclicality and concludes that 
real wages are indeed rigid downward (see review in Fischer [I98  11).  Other studies examine 
household or employer microdata and mostly reach opposite conclusions.  Although Holzer and 
Montgomery (1990) detect some downward rigidity, most recent micro studies (Bils [1985]; 
Solon, Whatley, and Stevens [1994]; McLaughlin [1991]; and Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 
[1993]) find evidence of substantial nominal wage cuts, which they take as proof that wages are 
flexible downward.6 The discrepancy between aggregate and micro results is attributed to 
composition bias, the impact of overtime and bonus pay, and worker mobility. 
We argue that, more important, the existence of nominal wage cuts does not in itself 
demonstrate that wages are flexible;  meaningfbl wage rigidity occurs when wages do not adjust 
adequately to ensure efficient allocation of resources.  We seek to improve on the  direct 
observation of wage adjustments by looking for evidence of meanin@l  wage rigidity.  Hence, 
Three theories of "fairness"  have been advanced to explain why unemployed workers cannot bid down 
wages in a Keynesian recession: implicit contracts, efficiency wages, and rent-sharing models. Haley (1990) 
presents a modern review of the microeconomic theories that predict Keynesian-type wage rigidity. 
Another group of empirical efforts takes the unusual approach of sweying employers directly about 
compensation practices; see, for example, Blinder and Choi (1990), Kaufinan (1984), Bewley and Brainard 
(1993), and Levine (1993). These studies uniformly suggest that "fairness" is an important governing principle in 
wage-setting practices, and that employers refrain from nominal wage cuts except under extreme duress. 
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whether higher inflation facilitates the adjustment of interoccupational (relative) wages to 
shocks.7  To state this another way, we look for limited relative wage adjustments during periods 
of low inflation. 
b. Relative Price Disruption Studies--Inflation as Sand 
Whereas the wage rigidity story describes how inflation might facilitate necessary price 
changes among different goods in the market, the relative price disruption story describes how 
inflation and pricelwage rigidity may cause inefficient  fluctuations in prices.  In these stories, 
inflation entails variation in agents' price adjustments, distorting relative prices.  The sources of 
pricelwage rigidities posited in the price dispersion literature are menu costs (i.e., expenses for 
revising price lists, as in Sheshinski and Weiss [1977]) or consumer search costs (Stigler and 
Kindahl [I9701 and Reinsdorf [1994]). Both imply that inflationary price changes are unlikely to 
be transmitted uniformly and instantaneously. Such distortions cause market participants to 
confbse adjustment lags with real shocks, and thereby to misallocate resources and increase risk 
(Vining and Elwertowski [1976]). In this scenario, inflation acts like sand in the gears of the 
economy, impairing the interpretation of price signals. 
Price dispersion studies measure the extent to which inflation is unevenly distributed and 
use this to gauge the costs of inflation.  Early studies in this genre uniformly show that inflation 
raises the dispersion of price change indices and industry wage change aggregates. Fischer 
(1981) and Cukierman (1983) review and extend these studies. This literature is subject to some 
important limitations. First, as Hartman (1991) shows, increasing price variability with inflation 
could be an artifact of constant expenditure shares.  Second, the sand theory is most compelling 
in arguing that inflation distorts price relationships among similar or competing goods, rather 
than among the dissimilar goods represented by price aggregates. 
Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1993) also address this issue in their study. 
8 
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microdata.  One group of studies considers price changes in a single class of goods, generally for 
low-inflation countries. For example, Cecchetti (1986) studies magmines' cover prices.  Other 
research explores price changes in broader product categories in high-inflation environments. 
For example, Lach and Tsiddon (1992) study the variation of adjustment to food prices in store- 
level data fiom Israel. The proprietary nature of micro-level price data limits the broad 
applicability of any particular study in this genre, since the results are only for high- or low- 
inflation countries and for unusual or regulated products. Nevertheless, on balance, the studies 
suggest that higher inflation increases the variability of price changes. For the United States, 
during the high and declining inflationary years (1980-82), Reinsdorf (1994) finds that the 
variation of monthly actual prices within product category (rather than indices or price changes) 
rose as inflation fell, due to negative inflation surprises. The variation of price changes, however, 
was positively correlated with inflation. 
With respect to wages, Hamermesh (1986), Drazen and Harnermesh (1986), and Allen 
(1  987) find that the cross-industry dispersion of wage-change aggregates falls as inflation rises. 
They attribute this result to inflation-induced introduction of indexation, formal or informal. 
Card (1  990) reaches similar conclusions in a study of inflation's impact on wages set in long- 
term union contracts. Transaction-level analysis of adjustments is particularly important in labor 
markets because the composition of the worldorce certainly varies over the business cycle. 
This study explores the impact of inflation on the dispersion of a crucial price--labor.  By 
controlling for detailed occupation, we effectively replicate the comparability across goods 
(intramarket variability) sought in the product price literature.  Aside fiom adding a rnicro-level 
wage study to the literature, we extend price dispersion analysis by covering a broad array of 
prices across the varied inflation history of the United States fiom the 1950s to the 1990s. 
c.  The Impact of Inflation on Wage  Adjustment 
Our estimates of the terms in equation (3) should yield direct information on whether 
inflation is grease or sand (call these "Story G"  and "Story S," respectively).  Since these stories 
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operate over different levels of inflation. 
Story G, which pertains to the wage adjustments of firms with limited downward 
flexibility, can be described by the following firm's decision problem: 
min,  Ea(wi-wi*) 
s.t. (1) Eiwi I W  {budget) 
(2) wi 2  c  'v'i  {downward wage rigidity) 
The firm's goal is to match the market's (or, more generally, some desired) wage movements. 
We model this as minimizing the weighted sum of differences between wage change offers (wi) 
and the desired wage changes (wi*), in the context of an overall wage budget (W) and a rigid 
wage constraint (c).  Without solving for first-order conditions, the two constraints are 
potentially in conflict. However, when c is a nominal figure (such as 0) and the other parameters 
respond to inflation, fewer individual wage changes are subject to rigid wage constraint.  Thus, 
inflation relaxes wage rigidity constraints. 
Interestingly, downwardly rigid rules may also constrain wage raises during periods of 
low inflation.  When the compensation budget (constraint 1) binds, it limits wage adjustments to 
those that can be balanced elsewhere.  Thus, each occurrence of a wage constrained to exceed 
wi* must be made up on other wages.  While the traditional story of rigid wages stresses the 
unemployment consequences, a firm might choose to limit higher-than-average desired increases 
rather than lay off workers.  The simple conclusion we note is that binding downward wage 
rigidities reduce the variance of wage adjustments in two ways: first, by eliminating many wage 
cuts and second, by restraining increases in order to balance the compensation budget.  These 
restrictions will be evident in intentional components of wages that require occasional, 
substantial adjustments. An obvious candidate in equation (4) is occupational wage adjustment, 
OOP 
We propose a simple version of Story S: Employers offer different prices for similar 
goods in high-inflation periods because they disagree on the expected rate of local wage 
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adjustments as inflation rises because their uncertainty about inflation rises simultaneously. 
Widespread reliance on employer salary surveys (rather than direct measures of inflation, such as 
the CPI or GDP deflator) confirms compensation managers' concerns over matching 
competitors' actions rather than matching an easily observed level of goods inflati~n.~ 
Uncertainty in market wage adjustments may well exceed that of the goods markets due to the 
limited samples, retrospective nature, and infi-equency of salary surveys.  Story S is indicated by 
growing dispersion among employers' forecasts (i.e., larger a;t  and 0;)  as inflation rises. 
d  The Impact of Labor Productivity Increases on the Model 
Finally, the analysis below incorporates the realization that general increases in labor 
productivity have the same institutional impact on wage adjustments as inflation.  Since broad- 
based productivity increases shift out the demand for labor, employers observe other companies' 
productivity-based adjustments and include them in nominal firm-wide wage adjustments in the 
same way as they do inflation adjustments. Thus, productivity increases can substitute for 
inflation in both the grease and sand stories. In light of this, our independent measure of wage 
change (dMRP, the aggregate increment in the marginal revenue product of labor) is the sum of 
change in output prices (CPI-U) plus the general increase in labor productivity (outputlhour). 
Ceteris paribus, this sum should approximate the average nominal wage growth in the economy 
and leave relative wages unaltered. 
This point has policy implications to the extent that the grease and sand relationships, or 
their welfare costs, are nonlinear.  Suppose, for example, that story G is true, and the beneficial 
impact of rising inflation (plus productivity) has a negative second derivative. In that case, the 
benefits provided by the additional grease due to inflation are diminishing in environments with 
8~y  contrast, if employers were to agree on some expected inflation rate that proved incorrect, this rate 
wodd effectively operate as the true rate and would not distort relative wages among the individual firms. 
This focus makes sense because of regional divergence in wage levels and relativities (and the lack of 
precision of local CPIs), and because goods price movements understate average nominal wage changes by the 
growth of labor productivity. Indeed, a firm could well be worse off competitively if it were the only one to 
correctly forecast and incorporate a higher- or lower-thanexpected inflation rate into its wage bill. 
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factors considered here, we focus on the role of inflation while controlling for the productivity. 
e.  Hypothesis Tests  for Grease and Sand 
In summary, the nature of the patterns of wage adjustment depend both on the validity of 
the "story" and on employer reactions.  A priori, though, we know little about the precise 
functional forms exhibited by these two general relationships. They may be flat or steep; they 
may accelerate or taper OK Using the standard deviations of estimated wage-change coefficients 
from equation (3) to measure the dispersion of wage-change components, we test two 
propositions: 
1. If Story G is true, as inflation rises from zero, the ability of employers to adjust 
occupational wage differentials (O,3  grows, so the dispersion of the measured 
occupational adjustment coefficients (estimated in y) grows. 
2. If Story S affects the labor market, the disagreement among employers (a> and 0;) 
should be higher in years of higher wage inflation. Hence, the dispersion of employer- 
wage adjustment coefficients (estimated in Ip)  grows. 
Other factors could also affect the standard deviations of these components. In 
particular, large demographic shifts or more rapid difision of technology could alter the 
intensity of pressures for interoccupational wage adjustment. The propositions described above 
and the analysis presented below implicitly assume that the pressures for these changes are 
uncorrelated with our measures of inflation. 
4. Description of the Data 
Most previous studies of inflation's impact on prices examine price indices or industry 
aggregates rather than actual prices.  This paper examines annual changes in mean wages for a 
panel of occupations within firms, i.e., job cells.  Only a few publicly available wage data sets 
provide information on employers, and none of these offer occupational detail plus a long 
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private wage and salary survey conducted in Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh by the 
Personnel Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRBC) for at least 38 years. 
The purpose of the survey is to assist in annual salary budgeting at the FRBC.  In return for their 
participation, surveyed companies receive result books for their own use. 
Table 2 describes the basic dimensions of the CSS wage-change data set.  The complete 
CSS data set has 80,301  job-cell-years of mean wage observations." From these data, we 
compute annual wage changes for each job cell observed in adjacent years, creating a total of 
67,885 wage-change observations.12  Each observation gives the change in the log of the mean or 
median salary for all individuals employed in an occupation by an employer in the city.13 Cash 
bonuses are included as part of the salary, although fiinge benefits are not. From 1956 though 
1992, wages increased at the rate of about 5 percent per year, with a standard deviation of 0.083 
log wage points. 
Participants in each city are chosen by the FRBC to be representative of employers in the 
area.  The number of companies participating on an ongoing basis has grown over time fiom 66 
losee Hotchkiss (1990) for a summary of data sets with information on employers. For example, the 
microdata collected in Industry Wage Surveys and Area Wage Surveys by the Bureau of Labor Statistics have 
occupational detail but are not easily linked over time or preserved for long periods. Unemployment Insurance 
ES-202 data, when available, report individds' earnings, not wages, and lack occupational detail. The 
Longitudinal Research Database, maintained by the Center for Economic Studies, goes back to 1972, but covers 
only manufacturers and provides only mean establishment earnings for production and nonproduction workers, 
with no occupational detail. 
llUnfortunately, books for some cities in some years were not found. Thus, the data set does not include 
observations on those cities in those years. No observations are available for 1966 and 1970. 
12~ob-cell-year  observations where the calculated change in log wages exceeds 0.50 in absolute value are 
deleted from the sample on the assumption that most of these arise from reporting or recording errors.  This 
eliminates 193 observations. It also considerably reduces the variance of wage changes without causing any 
qualitative change in the estimated coefficients reported here.  Approximately 1,000 observations are imputed 
from cases where job-cells are observed two years apart. The imputed one-year changes are simply half of the 
two-year differences. Many of the results reported here were also run without the imputed observations.  Their 
inclusion does not affect the results. 
I3Medians were recorded from 1974 through 1990.  Since medians should be more robust to outliers, our 
results use means through 1974 and medians for the years thereafter.  Comparison of the coefficients estimated 
separately for means and medians for the years where both were available (1974 and 1981-1990) suggests that 
they are highly correlated (correlation coefficients of .97 to .99). However, coefficients estimated on the medians 
appear to show more variation than those estimated on means and are more highly correlated over time.  The 
latter two characteristics are consistent with medians being a more robust measurement of central tendency. 
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Cleveland and Pittsburgh evenly represented in the balance.  Overall, 192 companies have 
participated in the survey at one time or another, for an average of just under 13 years each (with 
individual companies' participation ranging from one to as many as 35 years).  The number of 
participating employers per year is shown in table 3. 
Each participating firm judges which of its establishments to include in the survey, 
depending on its internal organization.  Some include workers in all branches in the metropolitan 
area; others report wages for only the office surveyed. The discussion below uses "employer," a 
purposely vague term, to mean the employing firm, establishment, division, or collection of local 
establishments for which the participating entity chooses to report wages.14 
The industries included vary widely, although the emphasis is on obtaining employers 
with many "matches," i.e., employees in the occupations surveyed.  The employers surveyed 
include government agencies, banks, manufacturers, wholesale and retail trade companies, 
utilities, universities, hospitals, and insurance firms.  These are generally large employers. 
The number of occupations surveyed each year ranges from 43 to 100. (In this analysis, 
each occupation in each city is counted as a separate occupation; thus, the total number of 
"occupations" exceeds the number surveyed.) On average, each employer reports wages for 27 
occupations per year. The surveyed occupations are almost exclusively nonproduction  jobs, 
because these are the jobs that can be found in all industries. They include office (e.g., 
secretaries and clerks), maintenance (e.g., mechanics and painters), technical (e.g., computer 
operators and analysts), supervisory (e.g., payroll and guard supervisors), and professional (e.g., 
accountants, attorneys, and economists) occupations.  Many of the occupations are divided into 
a number of grade levels reflecting different degrees of responsibility and experience. Job 
descriptions for each occupation are at least two paragraphs long. 
14Since a participant's choice of the entities to include presumably reflects those for which wage policies 
are actually administered jointly, the ambiguity here is not particularly troublesome. 
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cities' employers.  This was checked by comparing wages in the survey to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' @LS) Area Wage Surveys (AWS) in the same years for the same cities.  The AWS 
also oversamples large employers.  Movements of mean wages for similar occupations were 
highly correlated across the two surveys, and levels were usually within 5 percent of one another. 
Although the survey has been conducted annually, the month for which data are collected 
has changed several times since 1955. Throughout this paper, we observe the following 
convention: Results for any year refer to the period of time between the preceding survey and 
the one conducted in that year.  In most cases, this is a 12-month span, but occasionally the 
period is less or more than a year. The appendix lists the periods included in each "year" of the 
CSS.  All data merged in have been adjusted (to the extent possible) to reflect time spans 
consistent with those in the CSS. 
Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh are more urban, have more cyclically sensitive 
employment, and have undergone more industrial restructuring than the nation as a whole.  Prior 
to the 1980s, wages in these three cities were higher than the national average, but now they are 
approximately average for the country. 
We also use standard measures of inflation and national output per hour in our analysis. 
As a measure of general inflation experienced in the country, we use percentage changes in the 
monthly averages of the BLS consumer Price Index for all Urban Workers (CPI-Q.15 Our 
productivity measure is the BLS nonfarm business sector output per hour worked. 
Annual mean log wage changes for each city appear in table 3. Although some variations 
are evident, mean wage changes among the three cities are highly correlated. But do they bear 
any relation to national trends?  Figure 1 plots the three-city mean log wage change over time, 
along with a simple measure of wage flexibility derived from equation (2).  This variable, labeled 
dMRP, equals the sum of idation (CPI-U) and aggregate labor productivity.  CSS mean wage 
15Experiments with the individual city CPIs yielded very similar results. For ease of exposition, we 
report only the results obtained with the national CPI. 
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increases in the CPI-U, but productivity was growing fairly rapidly.  From 1966 through 1973, 
wage and CPI-U increases both accelerated (with wages leading the way), despite the 1969-70 
recession and a brief respite caused by the imposition of wage and price controls in 1971. The 
relaxation of controls and the oil embargo in 1974 were followed by a dramatic spurt of wage 
and price increases, which then subsided until 1978, when price increases again reached into the 
double digits.  Average productivity also dropped during four years of the seventies, and CSS 
wage increases did not keep up with prices.  The 1980 and 1981-82 recessions ushered in a 
period of declining wage and price increases during which CSS wages grew faster than inflation. 
In 1987, price increases reversed trend and jumped ahead of CSS wage gains, peaked in 1990, 
and are now headed back down. 
The institutional model presented above suggests that expected or perceived changes in 
the cost of living and productivity are employers' primary considerations in the structuring of 
annual wage increases. From a budgetary standpoint, both inflation and productivity increases 
represent sources of revenue for compensation. Figure 1 confirmed the general synchronization 
of CSS wage changes with general price increases and productivity gains.  This observation can 
be formalized with overall correlations among the indicators charted in figure 1 (plus expected 
inflation), as shown in table 4.  The correlations between mean CSS wage adjustments and the 
CPI-U and dMRP  (0.84 and 0.74, respectively) are quite high.  But changes in labor productivity 
are negatively, not positively, correlated with wage changes over these four decades.  This 
anomalous correlation has been noted before and is due to the high-inflation, low-productivity 
recessions of the seventies and early eighties.16  Nevertheless, figure 1 and table 4 support the 
characterizations made here about the process of wage setting during the period. 
This figure demonstrates that wages in the CSS largely adhere to national trends, and 
thus may enlighten us about the behavior of wages in the nation as a whole.  It also puts the 
16See Eberts and Groshen (1991) for an example of similar results. 
16 
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wages and prices that underlie our research. 
5.  The Components of Wage Adjustment 
In section 2, we argued that wage adjustments have significant, distinguishable employer 
and occupation components.  In the present section, we verie that assertion empirically, with an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of wage adjustments of the CSS sample (see table 5) based on 
equation (3).  The first column lists sources of variation, and the second column lists each 
source's degrees of fieedom.  The data include three cities over 37 years.  Thus, average annual 
city-year wage changes absorb 103 degrees of freedom.  Since three cities are represented in the 
sample, occupation and city are interacted (accounting for 5,358 degrees of freedom) to avoid 
restricting all three cities to have the same occupational wage movements. Employers' mean 
annual wage movements absorb another 2,77 1 degrees of freedom. 
The third column lists each source's marginal contribution to the model sum of squares 
(over the contributions of the sources listed above it on the table).  We choose this method of 
presentation because of its parsimony when the data are unbalanced (i.e., the number of 
observations in each group is not fixed).  The results are similar to a stepwise regression.  Ifjoint 
effects are large (such as between occupation and employer in wage levels, as shown in Groshen 
[I99  la, 199  1  b]),  the order of presentation is crucial and a stepwise presentation can be 
misleading. Surprisingly, estimates of joint effects among these sources of wage-change variation 
(particularly occupation and employer) are minuscule; thus, the order of presentation is not 
qualitatively important.  Introduction of occupation after employer would change little in this 
table. 
All together, the model accounts for 27.9 percent of the variation in annual wage 
adjustments. That is, the R~  for the regression shown in equation (3) is .279. The residual 
variation in wage changes is presumably due to compositional changes and individual merit 
raises.  The fifth column of the table shows that slightly more than one-fifth of the equation's 
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while statistically significant, do not account for much of the variation here.  Occupation-wide 
changes, on the other hand, constitute more than one-quarter of observed variation.  By far the 
strongest effect is employer-wide changes, which account for almost half of the explained 
variation and 13.1 percent of total variation.  F-statistics for these five sources of variation are all 
significant at the 1 percent level or less. 
This decomposition suggests that the institutional model described above may provide a 
usehl fiarnework for understanding wage adjustments. We do observe distinguishable 
occupation-wide and employer-wide variations in wage changes.  In particular, the firm-wide 
wage movements are interesting because they are such a large component and because employer 
wage differentials are generally quite stable (Groshen [1991b]), suggesting that these may be 
errors and corrections. 
To the extent that employers consider their company-wide and occupational wage 
adjustments separately and the relevant information for the two come from independent sources, 
the standard deviations of these two wage change components will be uncorrelated over time. 
Table 6 presents correlations of the annual standard deviations of the three components of wage 
changes, pooling the three cities together.  These correlations are all positive, suggesting that 
some factors affect the variation of the components similarly.  However, as the model suggests, 
the intertemporal patterns of dispersion of the employer and occupation components are only 
moderately correlated. The higher correlations of the standard deviations of the residual and 
occupational components suggest that some adjustment of occupational differentials may not 
occur uniformly across employers.17 
l7 Alternatively, such shifts in relative wages among occupations may stimulate simultaneous 
compositional changes among job cells. That is, employers may accompany adjustments in relative wages with 
some occupational reorganization of their work€orces. 
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With this evidence that the proposed framework is reasonably consistent with the CSS 
data, we turn to asking how these sources of wage adjustment dispersion vary with inflation.  All 
specifications use the ANOVA results shown in table 5.  In each city-year, the total variation of 
wage changes was decomposed into three components, as shown in equation (3): occupation- 
wide changes, employer-wide changes, and the residual.  In this second stage, we regress the 
standard deviation of the components on the level of general wage increases (the city-year mean 
CSS wage adjustment) or the sum of inflation  and productivity increases (dMRP).  For brevity 
and because we have few unambiguous predictions for the behavior of the composite residual 
term, we report results only for the occupation and employer components of wage changes.  To 
confirm the robustness of our findings, we also perfbrm nonparametric, filtered, and panel 
versions of these tests.  Each of these enhancements is discussed in turn. 
a  The Basic Relationship 
Table 7 presents the results of basic quadratic regressions of our two dependent variables 
(the standard deviation of employer and occupation wage adjustments, whose means are shown 
in table 6) on the two proxies for overall wage movement.  To assist the reader with the slopes 
over the relevant range, we report the implied value of the independent variable at the maximum 
or minimum at the bottom of each table. 
Column 4.  of table 7 suggests a U-shaped (with a minimum at 2.2 percent) relationship 
between the dispersion of employer wage adjustments and the city-year mean.  In contrast, 
column 2 suggests an inverted U-shape (peaking at 13.4 percent) between employer 
disagreement and dMRP.  Interestingly, mean CSS adjustment--an internal measure of wage 
change--has less explanatory power (lower R-squared) than dMRP--the external measure. 
While neither quadratic term is independently significant, in both cases the combination of 
the two terms is significantly related, as indicated by the F test for joint significance. Thus, while 
the exact specification is not strongly supported, there is a clear relationship between the level of 
inflation and the standard deviation of employer wage adjustments. Indeed, plots of the 
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CSS adjustment and dMRP (3 to 10 percent), show that the shapes described in columns 1 and 2 
track each other fairly well; both slope upward fairly steeply. These results suggest that 
employer disagreement (including their errors--our measure of the sand story) rises substantially 
as mean nominal wage increases rise from 3 to 10 percent.  However, the lack of consistency 
between the coefficients on internal (mean CSS change) and external (dMRP) measures of wage 
increases tempers our ability to say whether the disagreement tapers off or accelerates at higher 
rates of inflation. 
Columns 3 and 4 apply the same analysis to occupational wage changes, estimating the 
amount of grease added to the system by inflation.  In this case, estimates based on the internal 
and external measures agree on a statistically significant, inverted U-shaped relationship 
(maximized at 10 to 11 percent) between mean wage changes and occupational wage 
adjustments. Again, the external measure (dMRP) appears to have more explanatory power. 
Indeed, both terms in the dMRP specification are significant, providing fairly strong, consistent 
evidence that while inflation may grease the wheels of occupational adjustments, any benefits are 
limited. 
The relationship between dMRP and the variability of these two components of wage 
aaustment is best shown graphically. The graphs also allow us to confirm that the quadratic 
functional form imposed in the basic regressions is reasonable, because we plot nonparametric 
estimates of the relationships alongside the predictions of the parametric regression. 
Figures 2A to 2D plot the implied relationships shown in table 7, along with 
nonparametric regression predictions.  l8 These comparisons suggest that the standard deviations 
of employer and occupational wage adjustment both increase with dMRP and the CSS mean, and 
that the basic quadratic specification we employ describes the shapes of the functional 
l8  We  choose the LOWESS smoother with a bandwidth of one, proposed by Cleveland (1979), for its 
robustness with respect to both axes.  Various bandwidths for 0.2  to 1 were tried, with little variation in effect. 
Cleveland recommends a bandwidth of 1, due to the tricube weighting already included in the LOWESS 
technique.  See H&dle (1990) for comparisons of nonparametric regression techniques. 
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of tick marks for the nonparametric regression:  Tick marks are plotted at each observation, but 
some overlap.  Generally, the nonparametric regressions confirm the parametric results; however, 
the potential importance of outliers in this specification is made clear in figure 2D. 
Over the observed range of dMRP and mean CSS changes (3 to 10 percent), each of the 
plots indicates a positive relationship.  The upward slope for employer variability appears 
markedly steeper than that for occupational variability, particularly at higher rates of inflation. 
We also note that although the standard deviation of occupational wage changes reaches a 
maximum at mean wage changes of 10 to 11 percent, the curves' flatness suggests that little is 
gained beyond rates in the neighborhood of 6 to 7 percent.  Allowing for mean productivity 
annual growth of about 2 percent, these results imply that any benefits conferred by inflation are 
exhausted after rates of about 4 to 5 percent. 
Under the model advanced above, our results suggest that the disruptive sand from 
additional inflation (as measured by the standard deviation of employer wage adjustments) 
increases rapidly as the level rises, while the potentially beneficial grease (as measured by the 
standard deviation of occupational wage adjustments) shows a slower and even diminishing 
relationship with nominal wage growth. 
b.  Filtered Results 
A significant concern with the basic specification is whether the ANOVA in the first stage 
correctly identifies the underlying factors we want.  That is, are employer wage changes largely 
short-term errors and corrections, while occupational movements are market-driven adjustments? 
Equation (4) clearly indicates that undesired terms may creep into terms collected by the 
ANOVA estimates.  Though we give a number of specific reasons why we believe these 
corrupting factors are small, we explicitly try to correct for them in this section. 
We use the nature of the corrupting hctors to filter out their effects.  Specifically, the 
potential corruption to the employer component is the possibility that firms alter their long-term 
"market position," a decision that is treated as uncommon in the compensation literature.  This 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmsuggests filtering out firms' long-term adjustments to emphasize their higher-frequency errors. 
Similarly, occupationally correlated errors could corrupt the occupation components. 
Eliminating high-frequency changes should leave a purer measure of the presumably longer-term 
adjustments of the occupational wage structure to shifts in supply or demand. 
We use the filters on the first-stage regression coefficients obtained fiom the ANOVA. 
Then we calculate standard deviations for the filtered employer and occupation components and 
run the same basic quadratic specifications. The results, shown in figures 3A to 3D, generally 
confirm the results found for the unfiltered components. A minor exception is figure 3C, where 
the filtered relationship turns down more steeply.  The levels of variation in the filtered 
components are lower, as would be expected. We take these results as confirmation of the 
appropriateness of using the ANOVA procedure rather than replacing the unfiltered results, 
because the filtering process undoubtedly eliminates much of the desired variation in the 
components. 
c.  Panel Estimates 
Alternatively, the skeptic may fear that the relationships we find stem from a spurious 
correlation between inflation and wage-change variability, which could arise from some 
employers adjusting wages biannually, or from sample drift.  To address these issues, we obtain 
panel estimates (rather than measuring associations between aggregates) because the panel 
specification allows us to control for two classes of spurious correlation. 
In contrast to the basic model, the panel estimates correlate the absolute deviations 
(rather than standard deviations) of occupation and employer components of wage adjustments 
with inflation.  For the occupation regressions, we begin by calculating each occupation's 
absolute deviation from the mean wage adjustment in the city and year. Employer absolute 
deviations are constructed similarly.  The mean of these terms (the mean absolute deviation) is 
comparable, though not identical, to a standard deviation.  We then regress the absolute 
deviations of the cells on dMRP and two kinds of controls. The predictions of these regressions 
are the conditional mean absolute deviations. 
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abdev0ci.t = [:I  +  8[abde~oci.t-~  ]  +  gldMRPt +  g2  dMRPt2  , 
abdevemjPt  abdevem  j,t-l 
where abdevocit and abdevemj, represent the absolute value of the occupation and employer 
components for a given cell, the 6's are firm or occupation fixed effects, and t-1 indicates the 
lagged dependent variables.  The brackets indicate that those terms are included in only some of 
the regressions. 
In the simplest specification (without fixed effects or lagged terms), the panel estimates 
roughly duplicate the basic results shown in table 7, because the inflation rate is the same for all 
cells in a particular year.  However, the panel data setting allows us to control for two key types 
of extraneous covariation: correlation in firm decisions across adjacent years, and fixed 
occupation or employer effects.  Including fixed effects controls for some firms' or occupations' 
long-run propensity to deviate more or less than others. Lagged terms control for the previous 
period's adjustment in that occupation or firm.  These controls should handle, for example, the 
case of a firm that adjusts its wages only in alternate years--leading to an oscillation between 
large positive and negative adjustments relative to other firms that adjust their wages more 
frequently.  The controls also account for sample drift in the survey's occupations or employers 
over time. 
Tables 8A and 8B show the results of these regressions for the occupation and employer 
components, respectively.  The reported regressions are for dMRP.  Regressions using the 
internal wage inflation variable are comparable.  Specification 1 in tables 8A and 8B (the panel 
equivalent of the regressions in table 7) provides a basis for identifying the impact of the 
controls.  Specification 2 includes lagged dependent variables.  Specification 3 includes fixed 
effects for the occupation or employers, in combination with the employer's city.  Specification 4 
includes both forms of controls. 
Not surprisingly, since we are regressing a large cross-section of micro observations on a 
single macroeconomic series, we obtain a very low R~ in  specification 1. While the cell wage 
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between dMRP and the variation in employer and occupation wage adjustment components hold 
in all specifications.  From a statistical view, the correspondence between larger deviations 
during periods of higher inflation and aggregate productivity is strongly confirmed at the firm 
and occupation level. 
Strikingly, even though adding controls improves the explanatory power of these 
regressions, coefficients on dMRP and its square prove stable. While the coefficient estimates 
vary somewhat between specifications, they are consistent with each other and with the previous 
estimates.  The qualitative impact of the specification changes can be noted in the bottom two 
rows of each table, which show the implied slopes within the observed range of dMRP  and 
dMRP  at the implied maxima.  Table 8A shows that the slope of the predicted relationship falls 
by less than 1 percentage point with the introduction of controls.  The implied peak shifts back 
slightly more, from about 7 percent to 5.2 percent.  These results imply that the beneficial impact 
of inflation may be exhausted at lower rates than those indicated in the basic model, but the two 
sets of findings are otherwise consistent. 
Similarly, panel estimates in table 8B support earlier indications that the employer 
variation is even more strongly affected by inflation in the relevant range (implied slopes being 
roughly twice those observed for interoccupational variability).  Again, lags and employer fixed 
effects have little qualitative impact on coefficient estimates. According to these results, the 
disruptive sand caused by inflation continues to mount at least until dMRP levels of 8 to 12 
percent--far beyond levels where the beneficial grease is maximized--and shows less evidence of 
a turndown at high inflation levels. 
In summary, the robustness of the results to these panel controls rules out a wide variety 
of spurious correlations, increasing confidence in our basic results.  We have tested more 
explicitly whether job cell wage-change components deviate more when the level of inflation 
allows more latitude for wage adjustments, and the results are affirmative. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm6. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper explores inflation's impact on the labor market with an eye toward 
distinguishing positive effects (greasing the wheels by facilitating real wage adjustments to 
shocks) from the negative ones (throwing sand in the gears by distorting relative wages). We 
study wage changes in a panel of occupations and employers (from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland CSS) lasting from 1956 through 1992. 
The analysis, governed by an institutional model of wage adjustments, focuses on 
differences between the behavior of employer wage adjustments and occupation-wide 
movements.  We interpret the former as being more likely to include errors and corrections, or 
deviations in speed of adjustment, while the latter has a higher concentration of market-driven 
relative price adjustments. Relying on this distinction to interpret our results, we estimate the 
relationship between the standard deviation of employer and occupation wage adjustments and 
two measures (internal and external) of inflation.  We also note that in this model, general 
productivity increases play the same role as inflation, with the same costs and benefits. 
However, since productivity growth, unlike inflation, has unambiguous benefits beyond the scope 
of this exercise and is not a direct monetary policy target, we focus on the implications of our 
research for inflation policy. 
We examine the data in various ways to confirm the consistency of the model with 
observables. In support of the model, we find that in the CSS:  1) As predicted by employers' 
responses about how they determine wage levels, annual mean wage adjustments are highly 
correlated with external measures of inflation and productivity growth.  2) An ANOVA of annual 
wage adjustments among job cells suggests that employer and occupation components of wage 
changes both play large, statistically strong, independent roles.  3) Over time, the standard 
deviation of employer adjustments and occupation adjustments has a correlation coefficient of 
0.475; this suggests that, while these two types of dispersion may have some common influences, 
they often move independently of each other. 
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increases) and these two kinds of wage change dispersion, we find the following: 
(1) Is inflation grease?  Higher inflation and labor productivity appear to increase the 
range of occupational wage adjustments, although these potential benefits taper off 
after inflation rates of about 4 percent (assuming labor productivity growth of 1.5 
percent, the average rate over the period observed). 
(2)  Is inflation sand?  Higher inflation and labor productivity are associated with higher, 
potentially inefficient variation in employer wage adjustments. The variation between 
employer wage adjustments rises about twice as quickly as occupational variation with 
respect to inflation and shows less evidence of a turndown at high inflation levels. 
Thus, we conclude by answering the question posed in the title with "yes, on both counts; 
inflation can act as both grease and sand." Evidence from the CSS suggests that moderate 
inflation (below about 4 percent) speeds the transmission of interoccupational wage adjustments. 
But inflation also exacerbates potentially confbsing errors and corrections, or lagged 
adjustments, in employers' wage policies.  These costs of inflation have a steeper slope and a 
later peak over the range observed in this study, suggesting that inflation's costs continue to rise 
long after its potential benefits have been exhausted. 
We think these findings add a unique micro-level perspective to aggregate-level research 
on the relationship between inflation and productivity or income growth-studies  that skip over 
the mechanisms involved but presumably measure the net impact of grease plus sand on the 
entire economy. Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994) review and extend these analyses on U.  S. (and 
international) time series data.  They tentatively conclude that the level of inflation had a negative 
correlation with productivity growth fiom 1954 through 1993, suggesting that the disruptive 
impact of inflation outweighs benefits obtained from greasing the wheels.19 
Since we do not consider impacts of inflation beyond the labor market, our study cannot 
estimate inflation's net effect on overall productivity.  However, within the labor market, our 
l9 Interestingly, if monetary authorities acted as if they were aware of the relationships identified in this 
study, they might be most likely to allow moderate inflation during periods of exogenously low productivity 
growth.  Such considerations would also generate a negative correlation between inflation and productivity, as 
observed by Rudebusch and Wilcox (1994). 
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ranges for the grease and the sand hypotheses simultaneously. 
Suppose a monetary authority took our results at face value, neglecting other effects of 
inflation.20 These findings suggest that optimal inflation targets depend on general labor 
productivity growth.  In times of high growth (say, over 4 percent), inflation's costs in the labor 
market are virtually certain to outweigh its benefits, so inflation should be kept close to zero. 
Only during periods of low productivity growth might the benefits of "greasing"  the labor market 
with mild inflation (5 percent or less) be supported. 
20 We  also finesse the problem of weighting costs and benefits in the welfare function in order to 
determine a strategy.  Arbitrarily, the rest of the paragraph assumes roughly equal weights between benefits and 
costs, as measured by raising occupational and firm variability, respectively. Less symmetric weighting schemes 
would shift the policy recommendations accordingly. 
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Salarv Survev Coverage 
March  1955 - March 1956 
March  1956 - March 1957 
March 1957 - March 1958 
March 1958 - March 1959 
March 1959 - March 1960 
March 1960  -March 1961 
March 196 1 - March 1962 
March 1962 - March 1963 
March 1963 - March 1964 
March 1964 - March 1965 
March 1965 - March 1966 
March 1966 -March 1967 
March 1967 - March 1968 
March 1968 - March 1969 
March 1969 - March 1970 
March 1970 - March 197 1 
March 197  1 - March 1972 
March 1972 - March 1973 
March 1973 - September 1974 
September 1974 - September 1975 
September 1975 - September 1976 
September 1976 - September 1977 
September 1977 - September 1978 
September 1978 - July 1979 
July 1979 - August 1980 
August 1980 - June 198  1 
June 1981 - June 1982 
June 1982 - June 1983 
June 1983 - April 1984 
April 1984 - April 1985 
April 1985 - April 1986 
April 1986 - April 1987 
April 1987 - April 1988 
April 1988 - July 1989 
July 1989 - July 1990 
July 1  990 - July 199  1 
July 1991 - July 1992 
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Factors Influencing Wage and Salary Budgets 
Note:  Multiple answers were allowed, so percentages do not sum to 100. 
Source: Freedman (1976). 
Area surveys 
Cost-of-living index 
Corp. financial results 
Corp. financial prospects 
Internal equity among 
employee groups 
Worker productivity 
Increases given by 
industry leaders 







































































Description of the Annual Wage Adjustment Data Set 
Drawn from the CSS, 1956-1992 
Total Number of  Job-Cell Wage Adjustments Observed  67,885 
Number of Years  3  6 
Average Number of Observations Per Year  1,886 
Mean Log Wage Adjustment  0.050 
Standard Deviation of Log Wage Adjustment  0.083 
Number of Occupations Ever Observed  166 
Number of Occupation*City*Year Observations  5,27 1 
Avg. No. of Occupation*City Observations Per Year  146 
Number of Employers Ever Observed  192 
Number of Employer-years  27 16 
Average Number of Employers Per Year  75 
Note:  All numbers reported are for the first-differenced data set. 
Source:  Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
Community Salary Survey. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3 
Description of Data by Year 
* In 1970-72, the CSS is missing Cincinnati; in 1970-73, the CSS is missing Pittsburgh. 






























Correlation Coefficients between CSS Wage Adjustments 
and Relevant Economic Indicators 
CSS Mean  Current  dMRP  Labor 
Log Wage  CPI-U  Productivity 
Adjustment 
Current CPI-U"  0.839 
(0.000) 
~MRP*  (CPI-U + Prod.)  0.737  0.86 1 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
Labor productivity*  -0.482  -0.60 1  -0.1 12 
(0.003)  (0.000)  (0.5 10) 
Mean  0.05 1  0.046  0.062  0.015 
(Standard Deviation)  (0.022)  (0.035)  (0.028)  (0.0 18) 
*  Percent change experienced during the period. 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses below the reported correlation coefficients are the probability 
that the correlation coefficient equals 0.  Total number of observations: 37. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland Community Salary 
Survey. 
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ANOVA of Annual Wage Adjustments 
in the CSS, 1957-1992 
Marginal  Percent  Percent 
Source of  Degrees  Contribution  of Total  of Model  Stepwise 
Variation  of  to Sum of  Sum of  Sum of  F-Statistic 
Freedom  Squares  Squares  Squares 
City  2  0.1  0.0  0.1  10.3 
Year  3  5  2717  6.0  21.5  123.5 
Year*City  63  3.2  0.7  2.5  8.0 
Occ*Year*City  5,270  37.5  8.1  29.1  1.2 
Employer*Year  2,7 16  60.4  13.1  46.9  4.5 
Model  8,086  128.8  27.9  100.0 
Residual  59,798  333.3  72.1 
Total  67,884  462.1  100.0 
*The three cities are Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh. The years are 1956-1957 through 
1991-1992. Overall, 166 occupations are ever surveyed; in the ANOVA, each occupation is 
counted separately for each city in each year.  Similarly, a total of  192 employers are ever 
observed. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank  of Cleveland Community Salary 
Survey. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6 
Standard Deviations and Correlations 
of Components of Annual Wage Changes 
Component: 
Total  Occupation  Employer  Residual 
Mean Standard 
Deviation of Wage  0.0775  0.0273  0.0333  0.0670 
Adjustments 




Occupation Std. Dev.  0.766 
Employer S  td. Dev.  0.676  0.475 
Residual Std. Dev.  0.965  0.7 19  0.479 
Note:  All correlations are significant at the 0.0001 level. Total number of  city-year observations: 104. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Swey. 
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Wage Inflation and the Standard Deviation 
of Employer and Occupation Nominal Wage Adjustments 
*dMRP is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban 
Workers (CPI-U) and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community 
Salary Survey. 
Model 
Intercept  0.029  0.012  0.012  0.004 
(0.006)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
CSS Mean  -0.089  0.28 1 
Adjustment  (0.176)  (0.1 22) 
Squared CSS Mean  2.008  - 1.267 
Adjustment  (1.328)  (0.917) 
~MRP*  0.394  0.458 
(0.198)  (0.136) 
Squared ~MW*  - 1.475  -2.293 
(1.227)  (0.843) 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.107  0.138  0.111  0.15 1 
No. of Observations  10 1  101  101  101 
F Stat. for joint test,  7.01  8.97  7.22  9.86 
1  % cutoff = 4.82 
Implied Extrema 
CSS Mean  Min:  Max: 
Adjustment  2.2%  11.1% 
~MRP*   ax:  Max: 
13.4%  10.0% 
Dependent Variable 





2  3  4 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 8A 
Wage Inflation and the Standard Deviation 
of Occupation Nominal Wage Adjustments 
*dMRP is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban 
Workers (CPI-U) and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community 
Salary Survey. 
Model 
Intercept  0.006  0.006  0.009  0.01 1 
(0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004) 
Lagged  0.222  0.002 
Adjustment  (0.0037)  (0.0038) 
~MRP*  0.245  0.142  0.182  0.1 17 
(0.0120)  (0.01 19)  (0.0107)  (0.01 19) 
Squared ~MRP*  -1.104.  -0.578  -0.797  -0.4 10 
(0.0749)  (0.0745)  (0.0662)  (0.0680) 
Fixed Effects Included  None  None  Occupation  Occupation 
x City  x City 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.0158  0.066  0.254  0.250 
No. of Observations  67,885  62,87 1  67,885  62,871 
Implied Slope with 
respect to ~MRP* 
Mean + one STD  5.45%  4.29%  4.45%  4.62% 
Min. and max. of data  6.99%  5.10%  5.57%  5.20% 
Dependent Variable 
Absolute Value of the Occupational Wage 
Adjustment Term: 
1  2  3  4 
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Wage Inflation and the Standard Deviation 
of Employer Nominal Wage Adjustments 
*dMRP is the sum of the annual change in the BLS Consumer Price Index for all Urban 
Workers (CPI-U) and the BLS Nonfarm Business Sector Output per Hour Worked. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community 
Salary Survey. 
Model 
Intercept  0.0 13  0.012  0.0 13  0.012 
(0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
Lagged  0.180  0.1 15 
Adjustment  (0.0036)  (0.0036) 
~MRP*  0.148  0.086  0.159  0.1 16 
(0.0 158)  (0.0 156)  (0.0 153)  (0.0 152) 
Squared dMRP*  -0.225  -0.028  -0.238  -0.134 
(0.0986)  (0.098)  (0.0946)  (0.0953) 
Fixed Effects Included  None  None  Employer x  Employer x 
City  City 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.0 185  0.054  0.1 20  0.133 
No. of Observations  67,885  62,553  67,885  62,553 
Implied Slope with 
respect to ~MRP* 
Mean f  one STD  10.94%  8.07%  11.85%  9.33% 
Min. and max. of data  1  1.26%  8.11%  12.18%  9.52% 
Dependent Variable 
Absolute Value of the Employer Wage Adjustment 
Term: 
1  2  3  4 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure  1 :  CSS Mean Wage Change Versus dMRP 
End Year 
-  CSS  Mean Wage 
Change 
-..---  dMRP 
Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community 
Salary Survey. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 2A:  Standard Deviations of Occupational Adjustments Associated with dMRP: Nonparametric 
and Regression Predictions 
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Figure 28:  Standard Deviations of Employer Adjustments Associated with dMRP: Nonparametric 
and Regression Predictions 
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Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 2C:  Standard Deviations of Occupational Adjustments Associated with CSS Mean Wage 
Change: Nonparametric and Regression Predictions 
Smoothed  Std Dev  of Occ  Adj  +  Predicted Std Dev  of  Occ  Adj 
-03 4 
I 
I  I 
0 
I 
.05  .I  .15 
MEAN  CITY-YR  CSS  LOG  WAGE  CHANG 
Figure 2D:  Standard Deviations of Employer Adjustments Associated with CSS Mean Wage 
Change: Nonparametric and Regression Predictions 
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Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 3A:  Standard Deviations of Long-Run Occupational Adjustnients Associated with dMRP 
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Figure 3B:  Standard Deviations of Short-Run Eniployer Adjustments Associated with dMRP 
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Sourcej Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmFigure 3C:  Standard Deviations of Long-Run Occupational Adjustments Associated with CSS Mean 
Wage Change 
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Figure 30: Standard Deviations of Short-Run Employer Adjustments Associated with CSS Mean 
Wage Change 
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Source: Authors' calculations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Community Salary Survey. 
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